Abstract-Experimental evaluation is aimed at providing useful insights and results that constitute a confident representation of the system under evaluation. Although guidelines and good practices exist and are often applied, the uncertainty of results and the quality of the measuring system is rarely discussed. To complement such guidelines and good practices in experimental evaluation, metrology principles can contribute in improving experimental evaluation activities by assessing the measuring systems and the results achieved. In this paper we present the experimental evaluation by software-implemented fault injection of a safe train-borne Driver Machine Interface (DMI), to evaluate its behavior in presence of faults. The measuring system built for the purpose and the results obtained on the assessment of the DMI are scrutinized along basic principles of metrology and good practices of fault injection. Trustfulness in results has been estimated satisfactory and the experimental campaign has shown that the safety mechanisms of the DMI correctly identify the faults injected and that a proper reaction is executed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Validation is an important activity of V&V and fault forecasting [1] that allows to estimate the adequacy of a system with respect to the requirements given in its specification. Among the possible validation techniques, we focus on experimental evaluation (i.e., testing [1] ) of a prototype or a complete system by fault injection [2] .
A mandatory requirement of each experimental evaluation activity is to guarantee a high confidence in the results provided: this implies that the measuring system (the instruments and features used to perform measurements), the target system and all factors that may influence the results of the experiments (e.g., the environment) need to be investigated and that possible sources of uncertainty in the results need to be addressed. Additionally, proper evaluation processes and methods are key elements for the success of the experimental evaluation activity. Current situation is that, even if the measuring systems are carefully designed and actually provide confident results, that are not altered due to an intrusive set-up, a badly designed experiments or measurement errors, there is seldom attention to quantify how well the measuring system performs and what is the uncertainty of the results collected; moreover the approaches to assess algorithms and systems are typically different one from the others and lack commonly applied rules, making comparison among different tools and results difficult [3] .
If the measuring systems and the results are fully characterized, and if the evaluation activities are carefully planned and described, then guarantees on the confidence of the results and on the reproducibility of the experiments can be provided. Metrology (measurement theory [4] ) proposes among other things standards and good practices for the assessment of measuring systems and measurement results, and offers a contribution in providing a trustworthy evaluation. Guidelines and good practices of traditional experimental evaluation and fault injection studies can thus benefit from an integration with metrology principles, as metrology can be a valid methodological support to assure adequate confidence in measuring systems and measurements results.
Starting from these considerations, in this paper we present a fault injection instrument and some experiments for the evaluation of a safe railway train-borne Driver Machine Interface (SAFEDMI [5] ). The safety requirements of the SAFEDMI are classified as SIL 2 (Safety Integrity Level 2; railway standards [6] , [7] propose both qualitative and quantitative classes for the safety of equipments, and SIL 2 quantitatively means that the Tolerable Hazard Rate per hour THR is required to be between 10 −7 ≤ T HR ≤ 10 −6 [6] ): in this paper we evaluate the behavior of the SAFEDMI and of its safety mechanisms (mainly in terms of reaction to the faults injected) through software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI). The evaluation activity follows a structured approach that provides experiments that are easy to reproduce, and basics from metrology are applied to improve confidence in the results. Due to non-disclosure agreements not all the experiments performed have been described in the paper. A limited sample of them is therefore described here consisting of a faultload of five faults, of six experiments, and of the execution of 50 experiments. A preliminary description of our activities can be found in the report [8] .
A whole set of evaluation activities, from analytical to experimental, were performed on the SAFEDMI to validate the SIL 2 requirements, but they are outside the scope of the paper. A summary of the overall evaluation activities performed can be found in [9] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the SAFEDMI system, and in Section III we present rules and good practices for fault injection activities. In Section IV we define our activity, then in Section V we show the fault injection instrument and in Section VI we depict results. Conclusions are in Section VII.
II. THE SAFEDMI SYSTEM
In railway train-borne equipment, the SAFEDMI [5] acts like an off-the-shelf (OTS) SIL 2 bridge between the operator (the train driver) and the EVC (European Vital Computer: it supervises the train movement). SAFEDMI communicates with the EVC as a slave; it acquires and manipulates driver's commands (using a keyboard) for the EVC and it transforms EVC commands in graphical and audible information (using an LCD screen and audio devices). The SAFEDMI itself is composed of two components: the Driver Machine Interface (DMI) and the Bridge Device (BD). The DMI is the core of the SAFEDMI: it manages the communication activities with the EVC, with the BD, and with the driver (through a LCD screen and a keyboard). The BD is a wireless access point that allows configuration and diagnostic activities.
In this paper we will focus only on the DMI.
A. The DMI Operational Modes
The DMI has four operational modes (or states): Startup, Configuration, Normal and Safe mode. In [5] , another operational mode that allows automatic restarts of the DMI is presented. This operational mode is not implemented in the prototype that we are evaluating in this paper, and consequently it will not be described here.
In Start-up mode the initialization procedures and the thorough testing of all devices are performed; diagnostic functionalities are also available. From Start-up mode, the modes Configuration, Normal and Safe can be entered. In Configuration mode safe software upload and configuration are performed by means of wireless communication; after a successful configuration session, a restart of the DMI is needed (transition to Start-up mode). In Normal mode the DMI produces graphical and audio information to support train driving, as well as it acquires and processes driver's commands; periodic testing activities are performed and diagnostic functionalities are available. Safe mode is entered when a malfunctioning is detected and attempts to restart the DMI have failed. This mode prevents further operations of the DMI. In this mode the LCD backlight lamps are switched off, and the keyboard and EVC communications are disabled.
B. DMI Architecture and Mechanisms
Regarding the hardware, the DMI has a non-redundant hw architecture including OTS (Off-The-Shelf) components.
Absence of hardware redundancy imposes a more sophisticated software architecture, since safety requirements are accomplished only by software mechanisms.
The software architecture is composed of five C modules (Global monitoring, Checks and tests, Operations, Communications, I/O Manager) that are possibly activated/deactivated when the DMI transits from one mode to another.
The Global monitoring module performs the role of execution monitor, software watchdog, log manager, and diagnostic manager; it recognizes the conditions that cause an operational mode change of the DMI and performs the operations needed to reconfigure the system when a mode change happens. The thread execution monitor of the Global monitoring module performs transition to Safe mode whenever it receives notification of error detection by any safety mechanism; it is a high priority thread that cyclically executes once every 100 ms. The Checks and tests module performs checking and testing activities. The Operations module contains the software objects involved in the implementation of the functional requirements of the operational modes, as visualization and audio emission procedures. The Communications module handles the diagnosis, maintenance and EVC related communications, while the I/O Manager module contains the drivers of the DMI hardware devices.
Regarding the safety mechanisms applied to guarantee SIL 2, in SAFEDMI the reactive fail-safety principle was adopted [6] : as a consequence, efficient error detection plays a crucial role. According to the safety standards [6] , [7] , the DMI error detection addresses random faults that cover both permanent and transient faults and residual systematic faults (mainly software design faults that have not been identified by fault prevention and removal during development). Due to lack of hardware redundancy, active permanent and transient faults in the hardware and residual systematic faults are detected on the basis of their effects on software execution.
Permanent hardware faults are addressed in Start-up mode by efficient test procedures with high fault coverage, while in Normal and Configuration modes on-line (run-time) error detection is applied (e.g., periodic test procedures).
Transient hardware faults are addressed by three categories of safety mechanisms: i) data acceptance/credibility checks, ii) control flow monitoring and iii) multiple computation and comparison. The first category is applied mainly in configuration operations (by error detection codes and integrity checking executed to check transmitted files), and to verify passive objects (files, configuration data). The second category is applied in the test and checks module, in the global monitoring module and in the operations module (in this last module, control flow monitoring is applied in the audio management function and in the state change procedure). Finally, the third category is applied in the visualization and keyboard processing functions.
III. GUIDELINES AND GOOD PRACTICES FOR SWIFI
We briefly survey guidelines and good practices for SWIFI focusing on the assessment of the quality of the measuring system and results, and a few useful definitions taken from the field of metrology. Perturbation, repeatability, monitoring-time resolution, controllability are recognized as some of the most significant properties for fault injection tools [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] ; while designing both fault injection tools and experiments, typically relevant efforts are spent to properly address them. As examples in the field of SWIFI, we briefly mention the tools ORCHESTRA [14] , XCEPTION [15] and LOKI [16] and an experiment [17] performed using the FTAPE tool.
In ORCHESTRA the perturbation of the experiment on the timing behavior of the target system is quantitatively assessed exploiting the operating system (OS) support, and in XCEPTION the perturbation introduced by the tool is evaluated using system performance monitoring facilities. LOKI quantify controllability by an offline analysis to place injections events on a single global timeline and to determine whether the intended faults were properly injected.
To provide repeatability, minimizing the impact of factors which contribute to the measuring system but cannot be controlled by the operator (e.g., variability of delays on WAN) is a challenging issue, since many executions of the same experiment will not necessarily bring exactly the same results: for example, because the faults may not be injected at the exact time instants when they are intended to occur [17] .
Although the introduced properties are well-known and often addressed, there are no widespread rules and practices to drive in the assessment of tools characteristics and performing their comparison [3] . We identify the body of knowledge of metrology [4] as a possible candidate source for such rules and practices, through the identification of tools and results as measuring systems and measurements results according to principles and practices of metrology. In the remaining part of this Section we present basic concepts of metrology [4] , [18] . We note that basics of metrology are almost always put into practice during fault injection activities, but this is typically done in intuitive and not rigorous ways [3] .
Uncertainty provides quantitative information on the dispersion of the quantity values that could be reasonably attributed to the measurand (the quantity that is measured); it represents an estimate of the degree of knowledge of the measurand and it is usually expressed in terms of a confidence interval (a range of values where the measurand value is likely to fall). In [18] , two different ways to compute the standard uncertainty (uncertainty expressed as a standard deviation) are proposed and respectively called Type A and Type B uncertainty: i) statistically, as an estimate of the standard deviation of the mean of a set of independent observations, or ii) on the basis of a scientific judgement using all the relevant information available, as previous measurement data and knowledge of the behavior of relevant materials and instruments. Type B uncertainty does not depend on the amount of observations collected and consequently it is especially relevant when the number of independent observations is low.
Although intrusiveness is not explicitly mentioned in [4] , it is a well-known and relevant concept both in metrology and in SWIFI and consequently it is treated here. Any measuring system perturbs the measurand (even if the amount of this perturbation may be negligible), and possibly determines a modification of the value of the measurand: estimating and possibly minimizing such perturbation, that is estimating and minimizing the measuring system's intrusiveness, is therefore desirable when designing a measuring system. In (software-implemented) fault injection experiments, the behavior and timings of the target system are mainly perturbed by: i) the monitoring probes, ii) the injectors that generate both the faultload and workload, iii) the components that control the experiments. If such perturbations are not negligible and not estimated, the measurement results may not be representative of the behavior of the target system in its real executing conditions and environment. In other words, the population sampled may not be the population we aimed to sample. Consequently, the uncertainty of the results will address the confidence in the sampled population, without identifying and distinguishing possible alterations due to the intrusiveness.
Resolution is the ability of a measuring system to resolve among different states of a measurand. It is the smallest variation of the measurand that can be appreciated i.e., that determines a perceptible variation of the instrument's output.
Repeatability is the property of a measuring system to provide closely similar indications in the short period, for replicated measurements performed i) independently on the same measurand through the same measurement procedure, ii) by the same operator, and iii) in the same location and operating conditions.
IV. PLANNING OF THE MEASURING SYSTEM AND THE EXPERIMENTS
We identify the environment and the target system, the quantities to assess, the workload, the faultload, the experiments and the structure of results.
Environment and target system. The target system is the DMI prototype shown in the left part of Fig. 1 . The DMI OS is the real-time OS VRTX [19] . The DMI prototype we used for the evaluation is connected to a PC with OS Microsoft Windows R (shown in the right part of Fig. 1 ) where the applications EVC Packet Generator (a simulator of the EVC [19] ) and the diagnostic tool D360 (a tool that receives events and information from the DMI and logs them [19] ) are executing. A DMI prototype connected to a real EVC is currently available, but in our evaluation activity we prefer the DMI prototype connected to the EVC Packet Generator for the following reasons. The EVC Packet Generator does not require manual interactions of the operator with the DMI: as a consequence possible variations in different executions of the same experiment due to manual interactions (the operator may commit errors, or may press buttons with different timings in different executions) are avoided. The EVC Packet Generator generates the same exact workload for each experiment execution, and with the same timings (we will further discuss the timings of workload generation in Section VI).
Quantities to assess. The relevant quantities to assess are both countable dynamic quantities with (expected) negligible uncertainty and non-countable time-related quantities with non-negligible uncertainty.
Countable quantities are (number of) i) faults injected, ii) errors detected, iii) safe failures (i.e., after error detection, Safe mode is successfully entered preventing further DMI operations), iv) system failures and v) recoveries. Noncountable quantities are i) latency (time elapsed from the injection of a fault and its detection) and ii) reaction (after detection, time needed to transit to Safe mode).
Workload. The workload is created by the EVC Packet Generator that communicates with the DMI. We distinguish between two different workloads: W ID Startup and W ID Normal.
The first one is composed of the communications performed by the DMI from the power-on to train mission successful termination (the train successfully arrives at destination), transition to Safe mode or system failure; note that while the DMI is in Start-up mode the communication with the EVC is not active, and thus only scheduled activities of the DMI are performed (periodic tests and boot operations). The second one is composed of the communications executed since the DMI enters Normal mode up to train mission successful termination, transition to Safe mode or system failure.
This workload is specific for the Normal mode and the Start-up mode. We do not identify a workload specific for the Safe mode and the Configuration mode: in Safe mode 
Fault ID Description and additional comments
CFM goto A goto is inserted in the function that controls the LCD lamp, and forces an improper transition in the control flow graph.
CFM check
The thread Checks (it performs checking activities) is killed while the DMI is executing, thus altering the correct execution flow at task level.
DataAcc
Visualization messages received from the EVC are not elaborated correctly by the DMI (the data received are not computed correctly).
DuplExCPU
In the DMI, two identical graphic images are created in two different RAM areas and compared: the CPU makes an error while creating the text message of one of the images.
CFM signature An erroneous signature is inserted in the control flow monitoring graph of the audio output management function.
the DMI does not perform safety-critical operations (the communication with the EVC, the keyboard and the LCD screen are disabled) and the Configuration mode is not testable in current DMI prototype. Faultload. We execute software-implemented fault injections (we do not have the tools to consider hardware fault injection as a viable option). We perform run-time injections to inject faults at specific time instants. Due to the limited possibility to operate at the lower levels of the DMI system, we can only insert faults in the application level of the DMI (e.g., to modify the content of a variable or to alter the execution flow); we emulate i) hardware faults by directly injecting the errors and ii) software (systematic) faults.
The faultload we present is the set of faults shown in Table  I . For each fault we define an ID (column Fault ID) and a description of the fault. The selected faultload addresses some of the critical functionalities of the DMI.
Specifications of the experiments. The experiments defined are reported in Table II : for each experiment we define an ID (column Exp ID), the selected workload (column W ID), the fault injected (column Fault ID) and the time instant, after power-on of the DMI, in which the injection is performed (column Time).
For each experiment, the system is run until mission successful termination, transition to Safe mode or system failure. In Exp 1 and Exp 3-4-5-6 the injection is performed 30 seconds after the power-on of the DMI (the injection is performed while the DMI is in Normal mode); in Exp 2 the injection is performed 2 seconds after the power-on of the DMI (the injection is performed while the DMI is in Start-up mode).
Structure of the results. As shown in Fig. 2 , results are organized by a star schema [20] , that is an intuitive model composed of facts and dimensions tables: facts tables (table Measurements Results in Fig. 2 ) contain the metrics and properties of the target system, and dimensions tables Figure 2 . Structure of the data organized following a star schema.
contain the key features of the analysis (tables Experiments, Target System, Workload, Faultload and Safety Mechanisms in Fig. 2 ). This model allows to structure and highlight the objectives, the results and the key elements of our evaluation, thus it helps to define in an (as much as possible) unambiguous way the purposes and contexts of the analysis [21] .
V. DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND ASSESSMENT OF
THE MEASURING SYSTEM We present the measuring system and we investigate its quality and the validity of the results it collects.
A. Design and Implementation
The measuring system and its interactions with the target system are shown in Fig. 3 and explained in what follows.
We subdivide the measuring system in two functional blocks (the grey blocks of Fig. 3) . The first block, that is composed of the software C components Library, Injector and Workload Generator, deals with the injections and the workload execution: its function is to execute the experiments defined in Table II . The functions of the second block are data collection and analysis: this block monitors the target system, collects measurements results and analyzes them. The software components Monitor (developed in C), Data Collector and Data Analyzer belong to this functional block.
Regarding the first block, the Workload Generator is the EVC Packet Generator located on the PC connected to the DMI (described in Section IV and shown in the right part of Fig. 1) ; the Library and Injector are instead both located on the DMI. The Library is the mean to inject the available faultload: it enlists the available faults as well as the methods to inject them in the DMI. The identified faults are implemented adding extra code in genuine DMI functions or developing additional functions that are not part of the DMI genuine software. The number of instructions needed to inject a fault is always small, and these instructions are fast to execute: the perturbation they introduce on system scheduling and the impact on the overall computational load can be considered negligible.
SYSTEM UNDER TEST
The Injector performs the run-time injections in the DMI. It is a cyclic, light and low-priority thread active on the DMI. The Injector thread executes cyclically once every 1000 ms (milliseconds) with a deadline of 2000 ms. The Injector reads from a configuration file the instructions about the experiment to execute (Fault ID and injection Time), and uses the Library to select and inject the faults. The Injector can inject a single fault or a sequence of faults at specific time intervals one from the others.
Regarding the components of the second functional block, the Data Collector is the D360 diagnostic tool described in Section IV and located on the PC connected to the DMI (this PC is shown in the right part of Fig. 1 ). It logs information received by the Monitor, which executes on the DMI to timestamp events and to communicate events and related timestamps to the Data Collector. The Data Collector and the Monitor communicate using a dedicated serial channel, different from the serial channel for the communication between the EVC Packet Generator and the DMI.
The Monitor is an extension of the DMI log manager thread, that is a DMI genuine thread used for diagnostic activities (so we do not introduce a new thread in the system). The log manager thread is the thread with the lowest priority in the DMI, and it has no deadlines: it executes only when other threads are not running. As a consequence, to provide precise timestamping of events it is necessary to collect each time instant (by invoking the DMI system call getTime) as an atomic action with the raising of the event.
To reduce and control the system perturbation introduced by the Monitor, only events that are fundamental to collect the relevant quantities (defined in Section IV) are logged, and detailed traces of activities performed by the DMI are not collected.
Finally, the Data Analyzer is an analyzer (e.g., an OnLine Analytical Processing tool [20] ) that executes offline to exploit the measurements results collected.
B. Assessment of the Measuring System and of the Confidence of the Results
We assess the quality of the measuring system along the principles of experimental evaluation and fault injection and the confidence of results through principles of measurement theory: in particular, we comment on the resolution, intrusiveness, repeatability and uncertainty showed by the measuring system.
The resolution of the measuring system is investigated only for time-related quantities. System resolution for time instants is 2 ms (milliseconds); it is the resolution of the DMI timer used as the base for the activities of the scheduler and of all threads.
Three components of the measuring system may perturb the DMI: the Library, the Injector and the Monitor. To investigate intrusiveness we need to analyze perturbations in time and memory. Memory perturbation is negligible, since the executable files, the dedicated variables and the dedicated memory areas of Library, Injector and Monitor are very small compared to the DMI memory.
Time perturbation needs a deeper investigation. The injections are performed through few, quick instructions (they are not time-consuming operations as erasing memory areas or accessing a significant quantity of data) that are executed at worst in few microseconds. Both Injector and Monitor are low-priority threads that execute mainly when other threads are not running, to be as low intrusive as possible To further analyze intrusiveness, a schedulability analysis of DMI threads has been performed using the SchedAnalyzer [19] tool (it provides a pessimistic estimation of the CPU computational load of the overall set of threads on the CPU [19] ): it resulted that the set of threads is schedulable (threads deadlines are guaranteed to be met, and there is enough CPU free time to guarantee that the Injector and Monitor threads will execute without influencing other threads execution) [19] . Thus, considering that resolution is 2 ms, we can state that intrusiveness is negligible.
Repeatability instead cannot be guaranteed. The Injector is a low priority thread: this provides low intrusiveness, but it affects repeatability. In fact there are no guarantees that the injections are performed exactly at due time instants. The EVC Packet Generator affects repeatability as well: despite it is supposed to generate always the same workload with the same exact timing, such exact timing is not guaranteed because of the non-real time OS (Microsoft Windows R ) in use.
In fact, the experiments Exp 1-4-5-6 (Fig. 4a, Fig. 4d , Fig.  4e and Fig. 4f) show a high standard deviation of latency, being 489 ms in Exp 1, 518 ms in Exp 4, 666 ms in Exp 5 and 953 ms in Exp 6. This high standard deviation indicates somehow low repeatability.
As previously said, we have a limited number of observations: consequently we compute a Type B uncertainty through an investigation of the system behavior instead of a Type A uncertainty computed through standard deviation. Type B uncertainty is estimated for time-related measurements as follows. When an event is raised, the getTime system call is invoked as an atomic action with the event: the contribution to uncertainty of this block of instructions is orders of magnitude smaller than 2 ms (it is at worst microseconds). The resolution of the target system (2 ms) is the most significant contribution to uncertainty, while other contributions to uncertainty could be considered negligible. According to [18] , in such situations the true value is expected equally distributed in an interval given by the measured value and the measured value plus the resolution (e.g., if 10 ms is the measured value and the resolution is 2 ms, the true value is expected within the interval [10; 12] ms). The expected true value should be set as the midpoint of the identified interval with an uncertainty of at most half the interval (e.g., if the interval is [10; 12] , the expected true value is 11 ± 1 ms and confidence 1). However, our purpose is to estimate the safety of a critical system: we prefer to differentiate from the approach proposed in [18] and to report an uncertainty that is conservative, meaning that it must never err on the side of being too small. Consequently, for each event, we pessimistically consider that the corresponding time instant is collected with uncertainty of ±2 ms. The uncertainty of the two time intervals latency and reaction is finally set to ±4 ms.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE DMI
Having shown that the measuring system is adequate and able to provide trustful results, now we analyze these results in order to understand how satisfactory is the DMI behavior: in this Section we present the results of our experiments.
The results of the six experiments are shown in Figure  4 . Each experiment consists of five or ten executions. In the figures, the time interval elapsed from power-on of the DMI to the injection is represented in dark grey, latency is represented in light grey and reaction is represented in black. The errors are always detected by the DMI safety mechanisms and the Safe mode is always successfully entered.
Reaction is always expected to be smaller than 100 ms. In the experiments performed, the observed reaction is at worst 102 ± 4 ms (this value of reaction is measured in Exp 2). Although the value is at the limit, and some of the results obtained show a violation of the requirement, nevertheless this has not been considered particularly serious. In fact, the explanation of this violation can be traced considering the execution monitor -in charge of performing transition to Safe mode-which is a high priority thread with a cycle of 100 ms. From here it has been very easy to find how to fix this problem and to provide a guarantee of being able to respect the 100 ms deadline: it is sufficient to slightly shorten the cycle time of the execution monitor (e.g., to 96 ms) and still proving the schedulability of the entire set of tasks. However we are aware that further observations are necessary and need to be performed to confirm that such requirement on the reaction is fully respected.
As previously said, in Exp 1 we note the low repeatability of the five executions. Latency varies significantly from an execution to another. The measured values of reaction vary too. The standard deviation of the latency is 518 ms and the standard deviation of the reaction is 19 ms.
In Exp 2 the injections are performed while the DMI is in Start-up mode. In Start-up mode there are no interactions between the DMI and the EVC Packet Generator: as a consequence the EVC Packet Generator does not affect the repeatability of the experiment. In fact latency varies slightly in the ten executions of Exp 2 (minimum is 892 ± 4 ms, maximum is 896 ± 4 ms and standard deviation is 2 ms). Instead the reaction varies significantly: reaction is 6 ± 4 ms in six executions (the execution monitor activates slightly after the error is detected i.e., the execution monitor commands transition to Safe mode immediately after error detection) and 102 ± 4 ms in four executions as observed before.
In Exp 3 shown in Fig. 4c the injections are performed in Normal mode. Ten executions of the experiment are performed: latency and reaction are stable values, with the exception of the second execution of the experiment. In fact latency is 1204 ± 4 ms in nine executions and 102 ± 4 ms in one execution (the second execution).
This regularity appears to be due to the fact that the safety mechanism detecting the CFM Check fault (the execution monitor) executes independently from the workload. Probably the low latency of the second execution is due to minimal variations in scheduling activities of the DMI. In all executions, the reaction is substantially null (0 ± 4 ms). The execution monitor in this case both performs the detection of the errors and commands the transition to Safe mode: thus the distance between the two events is only of a few instructions.
In Exp 4, Exp 5 and Exp 6 (shown respectively in Fig.  4d, Fig. 4e and Fig. 4f ), latency varies significantly from an execution to another, but the reaction is a stable value (in the experiments, standard deviation of reaction is close to zero). The cause is that the safety mechanisms that detect the errors in these experiments are functions of high priority threads that are run just before the execution monitor. These positioning in the schedule to a short, fixed distance determines a reaction time which is not affected by the workload.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented the fault injection activity performed for a safe train-borne Driver Machine Interface (DMI), with the aim of evaluating the behavior of the DMI and of the safety mechanisms when software faults are injected in the system. Software-implemented fault injection has been applied on a DMI prototype, showing an adequate behavior of the safety mechanisms. In particular the faults injected were almost always properly detected and Safe mode correctly entered (thus preventing possible unsafe operations of the DMI). Only in one case a slight violation of the requirement was observed, analyzed, its caused detected and a simple modification identified to solve the problem. In our activity we focused on two aspects of quantitative evaluation that increase the confidence in the results and in the measuring system and that make the experiments easier to reproduce. The first aspect is the importance of assessing the quality of the measurements results and of the measuring system used to collect them. We addressed this aspect relying on principles of metrology. The second aspect is the importance of selecting and applying a careful methodology and approach to the planning, actuation and description of the fault injection activity.
